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The Enigmatic Legacy of Charles Fourier:
Joseph Charlier and Basic Income
John Cunliffe and Guido Erreygers
The origins of the idea of a “basic income” remain to be fully explored.
An idea with currency mainly in Europe, a basic income is convention-
ally deﬁned as an income unconditionally granted to all on an individ-
ual basis, irrespective of the level of any income from other sources,
and without any work requirements. In this article we examine the com-
pletely neglected contribution of an elusive Belgian, Joseph Charlier, to
the spasmodic history of proposals for a basic income and its cognates.
Although crucial aspects of the basic income approach have been traced
back to at least the eighteenth century, the conventional belief is that the
ﬁrst fully ﬂedged scheme was formulated in 1919 in England by Den-
nis Milner under the name “state bonus.”1 We demonstrate that Charlier
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guido.erreygers@ufsia.ac.be. The research for this article was made possible by grants from
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1. The rediscovery of that scheme must be attributed to the pioneering research of Walter
Van Trier (1995, 29–142). Dennis Milner (1892–1956) was an engineer. In his early life he was
a Quaker, and he used the Quaker movement to promote the idea of the basic income (or state
bonus, as he called it).
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presented a surprisingly modern basic income scheme as early as 1848
and then advocated it in other works over some ﬁfty years.
Despite being reticent about his intellectual ancestry, Charlier
acknowledged an initial but not uncritical sympathy with Fourierism.
The general afﬁnity between the idea of a basic income and the Fourierist
notion of the minimum—that is, a minimum presumably paid in kind—
has been indicated in some of the limited discussions of the intellectual
origins of the idea, but apparently not subjected to any sustained analy-
sis.2 This article analyzes Charlier’s scheme and its intellectual pedigree
in detail. In the ﬁrst section, we consider Fourier’s view of the minimum
and demonstrate that it differed considerably from a modern basic in-
come. The next section reviews the association between the idea of the
minimum and the doctrine of the right to work in the thought of Fourier’s
leading disciple,Victor Considerant.We then examine Charlier’s propos-
als and show that they constitute a genuine basic income scheme that is
distinctive and signiﬁcantly different from its Fourierist precursors.
Charles Fourier
The suggestion that Charles Fourier was an early proponent of a basic
income scheme has been made most clearly by G. D. H. Cole. In hisHis-
tory of Socialist Thought, Cole (1953–60, 1:310) explained John Stuart
Mill’s sympathy for Fourierism as follows:
Mill did, however, regard as much nearer practicability those forms of
socialismwhich, at a sacriﬁce of idealism, accepted amoderate degree
of economic inequality. On this score he praised the Fourierists, or
rather that form of Fourierism which assigned in the ﬁrst place a basic
income to all and then distributed the balance of the product in shares
to capital, talent or responsibility, and work actually done.
Mill himself apparently did not use the phrase “basic income” in his writ-
ings on Fourierism. Instead he preferred the more vague expression “a
certain minimum”:
The most skilfully combined, and with the greatest foresight of ob-
jections, of all the forms of Socialism, is that commonly known as
2. See Van Parijs 1992, 9–11, and Nozick 1974, 178–79; see also the Web page
of the Basic Income European Network (BIEN): www.econ.ucl.ac.be/etes/bien/Origins_
of_Basic_Income.html.
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Fourierism. This system does not contemplate the abolition of private
property, nor even of inheritance; on the contrary, it avowedly takes
into consideration, as an element in the distribution of the produce,
capital as well as labour. . . . In the distribution, a certain minimum
is ﬁrst assigned for the subsistence of every member of the commu-
nity, whether capable or not of labour. The remainder of the produce
is shared in certain proportions, to be determined beforehand, among
the three elements, Labour, Capital, and Talent. (Mill [1848] 1965, bk.
2, 211–12)
A close textual examination reveals that Mill’s characterization is with-
out any doubt the more accurate of the two. In this section we show that
Fourier’s minimum is certainly not a basic income in the modern sense.
The idea of a social minimum, that is, a minimum of goods deter-
mined by the level of subsistence, appears in all of Fourier’s major works,
both published and unpublished.3 We ﬁnd it in the Théorie des quatre
mouvements ([1808]1966–68); in the Traité de l’association domestique-
agricole ([1822] 1966–68), which was reissued later as the Théorie de
l’unité universelle (1841–43); in Le nouveau monde industriel et so-
ciétaire ([1829] 1966–68); in La fausse industrie ([1835–36] 1966–68);
and even in Le nouveaumonde amoureux (1966–68), a collection of texts
published only in the 1960s. It also shows up in many of his manuscripts,
not all of which have been included in hisŒuvres complètes.
The earliest mention of a minimum is in his “Lettre au grand juge,”
written in December 1803.4 Fourier characterized poverty (not inequal-
ity) as the principal cause of disorder in society, and he proposed to erad-
icate it by sufﬁciently high wages and by a “decent minimum” for those
who were not able to work.5 In another manuscript from the same period,
“Les trois nœuds dumouvement” (1803–4), he launched the idea that so-
ciety should give to every poor person a small amount of land.6 A third
3. For detailed information on Fourier’s publications and manuscripts, see Del Bo 1957 and
Poulat 1957.
4. On the date of the letter, see Beecher and Bienvenu 1983, 83 n. 1. The letter was not
published until 1874 (Del Bo 1957, 9) and is not in theŒuvres complètes.
5. “When the people enjoy constant comfort and a decent minimum, all the sources of dis-
cord will be dried up or reduced to very little” (quoted and translated by Beecher and Bienvenu
[1983, 87]). Parts of this letter can also be found in “Du plan providentiel” ([1806] 1966–68,
289–93).
6. At ﬁrst he proposed to “accorder un minimum de territoire à chaque individu pauvre” [to
give to each poor individual a minimum of land] ([1803–4] 1966–68, 458), but immediately
after that he made the stronger proposition that “la société doit garantir à tout individu, par des
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early occurrence is in the introduction to the ﬁrst edition of La théorie
des quatre mouvements ([1808] 1966–68). In a merciless attack on phi-
losophy and the “inexact” sciences in general, Fourier accused “reason”
of having contributed nothing at all to a solution of the problem of pro-
viding each member of society with a relative degree of comfort.7 Al-
though Fourier may not always have used the term social minimum in
the same sense, we may safely say that the following three characteris-
tics are fundamental: (1) the minimum is destined for the poor; (2) the
minimum is paid in kind; and (3) the minimum is advanced without any
work requirement on the part of those who receive it. The main goal
of the minimum was certainly not the reduction or elimination of in-
equality, but rather the eradication of poverty, by guaranteeing to every
member of society a minimal standard of living. This standard of liv-
ing should be at least high enough to cover the basic necessities of life,
consisting of (subsistence) food, clothing, and housing.8 In some places
Fourier gave detailed indications of the composition of the minimum.9A
mesures quelconques, un minimum de terre labourable (avec les instruments nécessaires), qui
peut fournir amplement à sa subsistance, sans l’éloigner beaucoup de son pays natal” [society
must guarantee to each individual, by any means, a minimum of arable land (together with the
necessary tools), which is productive enough to cover his subsistence needs and not located too
far away from his native land] (459). It should be noted that this is the only instance in which
Fourier interprets the minimum in terms of a (land) endowment.
7. “La Raison, quelque étalage qu’elle fasse de ses progrès, n’a rien fait pour le bonheur
tant qu’elle n’a pas procuré à l’Homme cette fortune sociale qui est l’objet de tous les vœux; et
j’entends par fortune sociale, une opulence graduée qui mette à l’abri du besoin les hommes
les moins riches, et qui leur assure au moins pour minimum, le sort que nous nommons mé-
diocrité bourgeoise” [No matter what exhibition Reason makes of its progress, it has done
nothing for happiness as long as it has not provided Man with that social fortune which every-
body yearns for. And by social fortune I mean a kind of graduated afﬂuence which shelters
the least well off from need and which guarantees them at least as a minimum the condition
which we call middle-class mediocrity] ([1808] 1966–68, 15–16).
8. A typical expression is “un mimimum social, un nécessaire en subsistance, vêtement
et logement” [a social minimum, a sufﬁciency in subsistence, clothing, and housing] ([1822]
1966–68, 2:156). Other expressions used by Fourier include “minimum ou nécessaire” ([1822]
1966–68, 3:39, 43), “minimum, ou honnête nécessaire” ([1829] 1966–68, 35), “minimum so-
ciale ou honnête nécessaire” ([1822] 1966–68, 5:382–83), “minimum d’entretien” ([1822]
1966–68, 3:48, 49; [1835–36] 1966–68, 9:491; [1852] 1966–68, 22, 321), “un nécessaire de
minimum d’entretien” ([1852] 1966–68, 22), “minimum d’entretien décent” ([1835–36] 1966–
68, 8:9, 12, 263, 374, 9:462), “minimum d’entretien et subsistance” ([1852] 1966–68, 20),
“minimum décent” ([1822] 1966–68, vol. 2, avant-propos, p. 20; [1829] 1966–68, 336, 339;
[1835–36] 1966–68, 9:T3; [1852] 1966–68, 340), “minimum sufﬁsant” ([1822] 1966–68, 3:15;
[1829] 1966–68, 29; [1852] 1966–68, 343), and “minimum intégral” ([1822] 1966–68, 5:387,
392, 402).
9. See, for instance, Fourier [1822] 1966–68, 4:445, and [1835–36] 1966–68, 8:288–89.
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few times he spelled out that the minimum should include “pleasure” as
well.10 He was conﬁdent that in a harmonious state the minimum paid in
kind would allow the poor to enjoy a fairly high standard of living above
the prevailing level of subsistence.11
In some of his writings Fourier apparently gave slightly different
meanings to the term (social) minimum. In accordance with his view
that economic inequality was both unavoidable and in any case desirable
because of its incentive effects, Fourier wanted the introduction of a min-
imum to leave the existing class structure intact. This could be accom-
plished by specifying a minimum for each class of society, expressed in
the notion of a “proportional minimum.”12 In other places he spoke of a
minimum in monetary terms. This occurred when he discussed how in
a phalanstery the surplus, and especially the part of it allotted to labor,
should be divided. The procedure envisaged by Fourier is rather com-
plicated, but one of its characteristics is that nobody who has made a
productive contribution, no matter how rich he or she is, can refuse the
minimum share.13
The justiﬁcation of these diverse forms of the minimum is largely
based upon natural rights entitlements securing the liberty of people to
10. A clear example is “un minimum en subsistance, vêtement, logement, et, de plus, en
plaisirs; car le nécessaire sans l’agréable ne saurait sufﬁre à l’homme” [a minimum in subsis-
tence, clothing, housing, and, in addition, pleasure; because the necessary without the agreeable
cannot be sufﬁcient for man] ([1822] 1966–68, 3:163). He also used the expressions “minimum
de plaisir” and “minimum en jouissance” ([1822] 1966–68, 5:544). In this connection it is in-
teresting to note that in Le nouveau monde amoureux Fourier proposed the notion of a “sexual
minimum”; see Beecher and Bienvenu 1983, 55.
11. Witness expressions such as “minimum copieux” ([1829] 1966–68, 3, 10), “minimum
abondant” ([1835–36] 1966–68, 9:490, 492), “minimum de subsistance abondante” ([1835–
36] 1966–68, 9:491), “un ample minimum” ([1822] 1966–68, 5:387; [1852] 1966–68, 97),
and “minimum supérieur au sort de nos bons bourgeois” ([1822] 1966–68, 5:4). Fourier ﬁrmly
believed that in a harmonious state the system of attractive labor and association would lead to
a massive increase in production.
12. Society should guarantee “un minimum ou nécessaire en aliments, vêtements et loge-
ments proportionnés aux trois classes, la haute, la moyenne et la basse. Il faudrait par con-
séquent trois sortes deminimum pour les pauvres des trois classes” [aminimum or sufﬁciency in
nourishment, clothing, and housing proportionate to the three classes (high, middle, and low).
As a result we need three kinds of minimum for the poor of the three classes] ([1822] 1966–
68, 3:169). In other places Fourier used the terms “minimum proportionnel” ([1822] 1966–68,
2:202, 3:171, 182, 4:270, 5:380, 493, 553; [1829] 1966–68, 291; [1835–36] 1966–68, 8:356)
and “minimum gradué” ([1822] 1966–68, 3:177, 4:582, 583; [1829] 1966–68, xij).
13. Cf. “le taux de minimum, huit fr., qu’on ne peut pas refuser” [the minimum ratio, eight
francs, which one cannot refuse] ([1822] 1966–68, 5:504), “le minimum que chacun accepte
par bienséance, pour ne pass’isoler d’association” [the minimum that everybody accepts for
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earn their own subsistence. The entitlements are variously classiﬁed, but
the four cardinal ones are the rights of hunting, ﬁshing, gathering, and
grazing.14 These rights could be exercised effectively in a state of nature,
but not any longer in civilization. One of the problems with civilization
was that it offered no real equivalent or indemnity for their loss. Fourier
argued that if people were deprived of their natural rights to earn their
subsistence, then society should at least make sure that its most vulner-
able members would not starve to death. This meant that a decent social
minimum had to be guaranteed to the poor.15 Fourier not only criticized
civilization for failing to offer an equivalent in the form of a social min-
imum; he also tried to show that even if it attempted to do so, the result
would most certainly be a complete disaster. If a social minimum were
to be guaranteed, one of its consequences would be widespread idle-
ness, as individuals would then have an alternative to the intrinsically
unrewarding “repugnant” labor they had been forced to endure solely to
secure a livelihood.16
the sake of convenience, in order not to be isolated from the association] (508), and “un riche
harmonien se trouve assez payé d’un travail attrayant, quand il est entouré de sectaires dévoués
et ﬁdèles appuis de sa passion. Il regrette que la bienséance l’oblige à accepter un minimum de
lot en industrie” [a wealthy harmonian ﬁnds himself sufﬁciently rewarded by attractive labor,
when he is surrounded by devoted and loyal sectarians who support his passion. He regrets that
convenience obliges him to accept a minimum share in industry] (511); see also [1829] 1966–
68, 316–23. Harmonian is a standard term used in English translations of Fourier’s writings; it
refers to somebody living in harmony.
14. At one point the set consists of the following: “1. Cueillette, 2. Pâture, 3. Pêche, 4.
Chasse, 5. Ligue intérieure, 6. Insouciance,” and “7. Vol extérieur” [gathering, grazing, ﬁsh-
ing, hunting, interior league, unconcern, and exterior theft], the ﬁrst four being designated as
“cardinaux ou industriels” and the others as “distributifs” ([1822] 1966–68, 3:164); an almost
identical list is given in [1829] 1966–68, xij. In another work, however, the rights mentioned
by Fourier are “1. Récolte naturelle, chasse, pêche, cueillette, pâture, 2. Libre essor des sens, 3.
Libre essor des âmes, 4. Participation au progrès. 5. Ligue intérieure. 6. Insoucance. 7. Vol
extérieur” [natural harvesting, hunting, ﬁshing, gathering, grazing; free development of the
senses; free development of the souls; participation in progress; interior league; unconcern;
exterior theft] ([1835–36] 1966–68, 9:490). It remains a mystery what Fourier meant by “inte-
rior league,” “unconcern,” and “exterior theft” in this context.
15. But in civilization just the opposite occurred: “Au lieu du minimum qui supposerait une
subvention du corps social pour assurer le nécessaire proportionnel aux individus lésés dans
les trois classes, riche, moyenne et pauvre, nous n’avons qu’un égoïsme général qui va crois-
sant et habitue chaque civilisé à rester pleinement indifférent sur les besoins de son semblable”
[Instead of theminimum, which would suppose a subsidy from the social body in order to guar-
antee the proportional sufﬁciency to the disadvantaged individuals in the three classes (rich,
middle, and poor), we have only a general egoism which is increasing and which accustoms
every civilized person to remain indifferent to the needs of his fellow] ([1822] 1966–68, 3:166).
16. This is a point that Fourier repeats over and over again: “Si le peuple civilisé jouis-
sait d’un minimum copieux, d’une garantie de nourriture et d’entretien décent, il s’adonnerait
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To avoid that outcome, the regime of repugnant labor had to be re-
placed by one of “attractive” labor, which was intrinsically rewarding.
This was one in a set of interconnected conditions that, according to
Fourier, would constitute the basis of social equilibrium in the “soci-
etary order” destined to replace civilization. Apart from the organiza-
tion of work around Fourier’s famous “passionate series,” which brought
together men and women sharing the same passion, the conditions in-
volved attractive labor, the minimum, education, and population con-
trol.17 Crucial in all this is that Fourier ﬁrst emphasized the necessity
of the social minimum,18 then pointed out that it could be introduced
only if a number of other conditions were simultaneously satisﬁed,19 and
à l’oisiveté parce que l’industrie civilisée est très-répugnante” [If civilized people enjoyed a
copious minimum, a guarantee of food, and decent support, they would devote themselves to
laziness because civilized industry is very repugnant] ([1829] 1966–68, 10). Similar phrases
can be found in [1822] 1966–68, 3:16, 39, 49, 172, 5:383, 553; [1829] 1966–68, 3; [1835–
36] 1966–68, 8:12, 9:492; [1852] 1966–68, 20, 22, 94, 97, 343; and [1857–58] 1966–68,
151–52.
17. “Comment espérer de rallier riches et pauvres, les amener à une affection réciproque, si
le pauvre est exposé à tomber dans l’indigence qui est l’épouvantail du riche? Comment assurer
au pauvre un minimum intégral, comprenant subsistance, vêtement et logement décents, si on
ne sait pas créer l’attraction industrielle, à défaut de laquelle il abandonnerait le travail dès qu’il
serait pourvu d’un ample minimum?
“D’autre part, comment réunir amicalement le riche et le pauvre, si celui-ci n’a pas reçu
une éducation propre à lui donner le ton et les manières du riche? Enﬁn, que serviraient les trois
propriétés précédentes si le régime sériaire avait, comme le familial, la propriété de population
illimitée, produisant des fourmilières sans balance numérique, sans proportion avec les moyens
d’aisance générale?” [How can we hope to rally rich and poor, to bring them to a reciprocal
affection, if we allow the poor to fall into the poverty that is the horror of the rich? How can we
assure the poor an integral minimum, including decent subsistence, clothing, and housing, if
we do not know how to make industrial work attractive, without which the poor would abandon
work as soon as they were provided with an ample minimum?
On the other hand, how can we unite rich and poor in a friendly way, if the poor have not
received an education that would give them the taste and the manners of the rich? And lastly,
what good would the three preceding properties be if the regime of passionate series, just as
the family regime, were characterized by an unlimited population, producing densely inhab-
ited dwellings without numerical balance, out of proportion to the means of general welfare?]
([1822] 1966–68, 5:387).
18. Cf. expressions like “hors du minimum point de salut pour le monde social” [without
the minimum the social world is nothing] ([1822] 1966–68, 3:172), “le droit primordial de
société, qui est le minimum” [the fundamental right of society, which is the minimum] ([1822]
1966–68, 4:193), and the characterization of the minimum as a “condition sine quâ non de
l’harmonie sociétaire” [the condition sine qua non for “societary” (i.e., cooperative) harmony]
([1852] 1966–68, 23).
19. Most clearly explained in [1822] 1966–68, 3:172–77; see also [1822] 1966–68, 5:380–
81; and [1857–58] 1966–68, 152–54.
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ﬁnally arrived at the conclusion that civilization would simply collapse
if it tried to satisfy those conditions.
Victor Considerant
In his capacity as the foremost popularizer and indeed the creator of
“Fourierism,” Victor Considerant endorsed this conclusion.20 His most
inﬂuential works in the period from 1834 to 1849 repeatedly emphasized
the orthodoxy that the provision of a physical minimum could be real-
ized only under conditions of attractive labor.21 Considerant pointedly
remarked that if a minimum were to be granted under the present in-
dustrial regime, then an incentive would be created for a general escape
from repugnant labor into widespread idleness.22 Since only the social
provision of a guaranteed minimum “to each man, each woman, [and]
each child” could secure liberty ([1840] 1845, 90–91), he argued that it
was imperative to move to an economic regime characterized both by
“un énorme accroissement de la richesse publique” and “le travail
attrayant” [an enormous increase of public wealth and by attrac-
tive labor] (1848, 50).
In some of his works, however, Considerant developed an alternative
doctrine of the right to work.23 This doctrine called for a reform-minded
policy applicable even under existing conditions of repugnant labor in
which the state would act as an employer of last resort, guaranteeing not
only work but also a minimum wage. In order to do so, there would have
to be the (planned) “organisation du travail, ou, pour mieux dire,
de l’organisation de l’industrie” [organization of work, or, to be
more precise, the organization of industry] ([1840] 1848, 32). In his
20. That role is examined in two recent works: Davidson 1988 and Vernus 1993.
21. Considerant’s main works in that key period were Destinée sociale (1834–44), Théorie
du droit de propriété et du droit au travail ([1840] 1848), Exposition abrégée du système pha-
lanstérien de Fourier ([1840] 1845), and Le socialisme devant le vieux monde (1848). In addi-
tion, there were his numerous contributions to, and editorship of, successive Fourierist journals:
Le phalanstère (1832–34), La phalange (1836–43), and La démocratie paciﬁque (1843–51).
22. “Il serait impossible aujourd’hui de faire au peuple l’avance du minimum: il tomberait
aussitôt dans la fainéantise, attendu que le travail est répugnant” [Today it would be impossible
to provide the people with theminimum: they would revert immediately to laziness, since labor
is repugnant] (Considerant [1840] 1845, 49; see also Considerant 1848, 50).
23. The key text is Considerant [1840] 1848; see also Considerant 1834–44, 1:153–55.
Davidson 1988, 71–73, contains an analysis of Considerant’s own doctrine and its connections
to Fourier’s use of the phrase “right to work.” With respect to Fourier’s views, see Beecher
1986, 213–14.
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extended justiﬁcation of the right to work, Considerant distinguished two
kinds of capital: the “primitive or natural capital” of all natural resources
and especially land; and the “created capital” produced by human labor
by means of those resources. Property rights in natural resources should
be a collective usufruct of humanity across generations and regardless
of location. Provided that this was the case, property rights in created
capital should be private, in direct proportion to an individual’s contri-
bution and including personal transmission between generations. How-
ever, the existing property regimes in civilized societies were based on
the usurpation of natural capital by a minority of private landowners. The
consequence was that conventional legal titles to property expressed the
cumulative effects of natural rights’ violations. The excluded majority
had not only been deprived of natural rights entitlements but also denied
any compensation. The right to work was intended to provide precisely
that compensation ([1840] 1848, 34–36).
Considerant’s argument for a compensatory strategy was based on a
presumption against any radical change to the current concentration of
private landownership, especially in the form of equal division.Any such
change would be undesirable because it could be achieved, if at all, only
by a violent revolution. It would be self-defeating because any initial pat-
tern of equal division would become unequal through time as the popu-
lation changed. It would entail, moreover, the return to the savage state
together with the abandonment of the (potential) advantages of indus-
trialism for all. Above all, it would be superﬂuous because the natural
rights to primitive capital were not rights to equal individual shares in
land but those of each person to hunt, ﬁsh, gather fruit, and let his or
her animals graze on the commons. The issue was not to resurrect those
rights in their “primitive and crude form,” but to ﬁnd “the form in which
[they] could be reconciled with the conditions of an industrious society”
([1840] 1848, 23–24).
For Considerant himself, at least, the solution to that issue was sim-
ple. In primitive society, these rights could be exercised only through in-
dividual activity. By analogy, in civilized society, the compensation for
their violation had to allow each individual the opportunity to engage in
productive activity:
Qu’une Société industrieuse, qui a pris possession de la Terre et qui
enlève à l’homme la faculté d’exercer à l’aventure et en liberté,
sur la surface du sol, ses quatre Droits naturels; que cette Société
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reconnaisse à l’individu, en compensation de ces Droits dont elle le
dépouille, le droit au travail: alors, en principe et sauf application
convenable, l’individu n’aura plus à se plaindre. [When an industrious
Society has taken over the Earth and denies man the power to exercise
his four natural Rights on earth as he wishes and in complete freedom,
this Society should allow the individual the right to work in order
to compensate him for the Rights of which he is deprived; then, in
principle, and assuming a convenient application, the individual will
have no further grounds for complaint.] ([1840] 1848, 24)
Considerant hastened to add the requirement that the reward for this pro-
ductive activity should be at least as high as that which would have been
achieved in the state of nature, which effectively turned him into an ad-
vocate of the right to work at a wage sufﬁcient to secure subsistence:
La condition sine quâ non pour la Légitimité de la Propriété est donc
que la Société reconnaisse au Prolétaire le droitautravail et qu’elle
lui assure au moins autant de moyens de subsistance, pour un exercice
d’activité donné, que cet exercice eût pu lui en procurer dans l’État
primitif. [The condition sine qua non for the Legitimacy of Property
is therefore that Society awards to the Proletarian the right to work
and that it guarantees to him at least as many means of subsistence,
for a given amount of effort, as this effort could have given him in the
State of nature.] (24–25)
This was the minimum condition of a legitimate property regime in ac-
cordance with natural rights. However, for Considerant, the duties of
such a regime might actually go beyond this; an individual born into
a civilized society might have new wants created by that society itself,
which would generate a claim to more than would have been available
in any state of nature.
Sometimes, therefore, Considerant promoted the Fourierist orthodoxy
that the guarantee of a minimum could be given only under a regime
of attractive labor. On other occasions, he advocated the right to work
as a doctrine that might be realized even under a regime of repugnant
labor. In the ﬁrst case, the entitlement was derived from a natural right
to subsistence itself; in the second, it was derived from a natural right to
the equal opportunity to gain a subsistence through labor.24
24. In a similar vein, the Fourierist writer Zoé Gatti de Gamond ([1838] 1841–42, 42)
strongly advocated the minimum, the right to work, and education as compensations for the
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Joseph Charlier
The right to work was debated widely by socialist thinkers involved in
the 1848 revolution in Paris, when leftist parties were in power between
February and June and abolished the monarchy.25 These debates were
followed carefully in Brussels, which acted as a center of refuge for
many signiﬁcant French and German socialists of the period.26 Undoubt-
edly, Joseph Charlier, who ﬁrst published his views on what was known
as the social question—it referred mainly to the condition of the labor-
ing population—in the second half of 1848, was well aware of the ideas
that were circulating. Whether or not he was directly reacting to Con-
siderant’s views, it is clear that he accepted Considerant’s critique of the
existing property regime but rejected the adequacy of the right to work as
a surrogate for natural rights entitlements. The originality of Charlier is
that he argued that those entitlements should be recognized by an uncon-
ditional basic income scheme, even under conditions of repugnant labor.
Charlier was born in Brussels on 20 June 1816 and died there on 6 De-
cember 1896. He published at least thirteen books, ranging from novels
and poetry to works on technical legal issues and social theory. The four
key works in that last category were as follows:
• Solution du problème social ou constitution humanitaire, basée sur
la loi naturelle, et précédée de l’exposé de motifs (1848). This in-
troduced the scheme for a “guaranteed minimum” funded from the
socialization of rent. Charlier explained in detail why he advocated
the scheme, and he presented it in the form of a “humanitarian con-
stitution.”
• Catéchisme populaire, philosophique, politique et social (1871).
Here Charlier reﬁned the core theme of the guaranteed minimum
under the new form of “the system of territorial dividend.”
loss of natural rights: “Ne serait-il pas d’une justice rigoureuse que la société lui donnât un dé-
dommagement équivalent à la perte des droits naturels? N’est-ce pas pour elle un devoir sacré
d’assurer à tous ses membres le minimum, le droit au travail et l’éducation ou développement
des facultés qui rendent l’homme apte à participer aux bienfaits des arts, des sciences et de
l’industrie, cachet de la civilisation?” [Would it not be rigorously right that society offered a
person an indemnity equivalent to the loss of that person’s natural rights? Is it not a sacred duty
for society to guarantee to all its members the minimum, the right to work, and education, or
the development of the abilities that allow man to share in the beneﬁts of the arts, sciences, and
industry, the mark of civilization?]
25. See Tanghe 1989 for an overview of the intellectual discussion on the right to work.
26. Marx and Engels spent some time in Brussels, as did Considerant.
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• La question sociale résolue précédée du testament philosophique
d’un penseur (1894b). This is Charlier’s most substantial work. He
reproduced the relevant sections of the Catéchisme on territorial
dividend, included a scheme for pension provision initially sug-
gested in 1887, and introduced another “humanitarian constitution”
that was similar but not identical to the 1848 version, together with
a set of justifying “interpretative remarks.”
• L’anarchie désarmée par l’équité: Corollaire à la question sociale
résolue (1894a). This summarized the diagnosis and solution of so-
cial issues presented immediately before in La question sociale ré-
solue.
Apart from these texts, we have very little to work with.27 His exact pro-
fession is unknown; he once classiﬁed himself as a “juriste” (1894b,
10),28 but in successive population registers his occupation is variously
listed as “writer,” “accountant,” and “merchant.”29 He is considered only
in passing in many of the standard sources on the history of socialism in
Belgium, and there is no substantial study of either his life or work.30
In one of these passing references Charlier is designated as a “Fouri-
erist.”31 This might well be an accurate description, but we have found no
evidence to suggest that he played a signiﬁcant role in Belgian Fourierist
27. Despite our sustained attempts to discover more information, Charlier remains much of
a mystery.
28. His preoccupation with legal issues conﬁrms that he was active in some capacity in
the Belgian judicial system. On occasions he severely criticized the system as a whole—
“Toute cette corporation parasite de juges, d’avocats, d’avoués et d’huissiers qui génénerale-
ment vivent et s’enrichissent aux dépens de la masse; car tous gens-là ne produisent rien,
n’ajoutent pas un atome au capital social” [This whole parasitic corporation of judges, lawyers,
bailiffs, and ushers who in general live and enrich themselves at the expense of the masses; be-
cause all these people do not produce anything at all, do not add a single atom to the social
capital] (1848, 63)—and notaries in particular: “le notariat n’ajoute rien à la richesse publique”
[notaries do not add anything to public wealth] (1871, 41). He also characterized himself as
an active member of the “Société internationale d’études sociales et politiques” (1894b, 3), by
which was meant the “Société d’études sociales et politiques,” active in Belgium between 1890
and 1895 (Crombois 1994, 16–20). We are uncertain whether Joseph Charlier is the Charlier
who played an active role in the Brussels-basedCercleDémocratique around 1880; seeWouters
1971, 3:1504, 1513, 1518, 1525, 1553.
29. This information has been provided to us by Maryline Van Parijs.
30. References to Charlier have been made by Benoit Malon (1879, 475, 488–89; 1892,
115), Ernest Henrion (1892, 132), Louis Bertrand (1902, 1:175; 1906–7, 2:424, 428–30),Victor
Serwy (1948–52, 1:27, 96–97, 4:110), Jan Dhondt (1960, 271), and Bernard Dandois (1974,
21).
31. Serwy (1948–52, 4:110) described him as “publiciste, poète, fouriériste.”
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circles.32 Although the intellectual provenance of his views is unknown,
it cannot be denied that in the Solution, Charlier did indeed present a
sympathetic but not uncritical assessment of Fourier and Fourierism. He
explicitly (but not unconditionally) praised Fourier and his work,33 and
he used terms clearly borrowed from the Fourierist tradition.34 In all of
Charlier’s subsequent works, however, neither Fourier nor his theory is
referred to, as if Charlier later in life distanced himself from his original
source of inspiration.
In the Solution, Charlier (1848, 19) insisted in a typically Fourierist
manner that the central problem to be addressed was the “amélioration
du sort des classes déshéritées” [the improvement of the condition of
the disinherited classes]. This was above all a “material question” re-
lating to “physical life”: the concern should be with material, not po-
litical, rights, and the aim should be to realize “physical” or “material
emancipation” but without political or social upheaval. He rejected two
currently fashionable responses to the problem: “the right to assistance”
addressed only the effects and not the cause of the problem, whereas the
“right to work/organization of labor” would result in an unacceptable
extension of state control.35 Instead, he proposed an alternative solution
that both guaranteed natural rights entitlements and respected existing
legal titles, through compensation arrangements.
32. Although we cannot state conﬁdently that he was inﬂuential in Belgian Fourierist cir-
cles, consider that the publication of his 1848 book was signaled in Le débat social, a Brussels-
based journal with Fourierist sympathies, together with the announcement “nous nous em-
presserons d’en rendre compte quand nous en aurons fait l’examen” [we will do our best to
give an account of it as soon as we have examined it] (Le débat social 1848, 217); the promised
review never appeared. There is no trace of Charlier in the study by Ernest Discailles (1895)
on Considerant’s inﬂuence in Belgium.
33. “De toutes les doctrines socialistes mises en avant, il n’en est aucune qui puisse être
traduit en fait sans jeter la société dans une grande perturbation, en tant du moins qu’elles
touchent aux intérêts matériels, le Fouriérisme excepté. Mais le Fouriérisme c’est une merveille
orientale qui charme, subjugue et fascine l’esprit, et qu’on admire comme une brillante féerie.
Il faut quant à présent une machine moins compliquée, et qui soit surtout dégagée de toute
espèce d’illusion” [Of all the socialist doctrines that have been put forward, with the exception
of Fourierism, there is none that can be translated into reality without throwing society into a
state of disorder, at least with regard to its material interests. But Fourierism is like an Oriental
wonder that charms, seduces, and fascinates the mind, and that one admires like a brilliant
spectacle. But as of now we need a less complicated device, and above all one that would be
clear of any type of illusion] (Charlier 1848, 10; see also 11, 37, 39, and 40).
34. Such as “minimum garanti” (1848, 33, 37), “destinée sociale” (20), “travail
. . . attrayant” (36), “industries répugnantes” (36), and “garantisme rationnel” (83).
35. On the right to assistance, see Charlier 1848, 6–7; on the right to work, see Charlier
1848, 11–14.
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Charlier adopted the familiar jurisprudential contrast between natu-
ral and produced resources. Like Considerant, he argued that a creators-
keepers principle did not justify individual property rights in land it-
self, but only in assets resulting from human labor.36 That familiar dis-
tinction was given a new dimension by Charlier, however. He main-
tained that natural resources were intended by God to provide a guar-
antee for the “vital needs” of all persons. Produced assets by contrast
were destined to meet the “acquired needs” of each person.37 Only the
vital needs generated an absolute right: because every human being had
the right to live, each person had a right to a share of the fruits of the
earth sufﬁcient to provide subsistence.38 The essential role of the state
consisted in guaranteeing these individual rights to the produce of the
common patrimony by ensuring that all were included and none ex-
cluded. The acquired needs did not generate a right but merely a discre-
tionary power.39 Whether and to what extent these relative needs were
fulﬁlled was a matter for individual choice expressed through labor. For
36. “Le sol à personne, mais le fruit à tous. Telle est la grande, la véritable maxime sur
laquelle repose le salut de la société humaine et dont nous allons démontrer la légitimité intrin-
sèque et les bienfaits” [The land to nobody, but the fruit to all. That is the great, true maxim on
which the faith of human society rests and of which we will demonstrate the intrinsic legitimacy
and beneﬁts] (1848, 23).
37. We use the expression “vital needs” for Charlier’s “besoins absolus,” “besoins naturels,”
and “besoins naturels et vitaux,” and “acquired needs” for his “besoins relatifs,” “besoins arti-
ﬁciels,” and “besoins acquis.”
38. “L’homme en naissant apporte avec lui le droit de vivre; de ce droit inhérent à son
être et que personne à coup sûr n’osera lui contester, découle comme conséquence obligée le
droit de demander au sol, patrimoine commun des hommes, sa part dans les fruits nécessaires
à son existence” [When he is born man brings with him the right to live; from this right, which
is inherent to his being and which surely nobody will dare to contest, follows as a necessary
consequence, the right to demand from the land, the common patrimony of men, his share of
the fruits that he needs for his existence] (1848, 20).
39. “Les besoins absolus sont ceux indispensables à l’entretien de la vie. Ils constituent
dans le chef de l’individu un droit.
Les besoins relatifs ou acquis sont ceux que donne le rafﬁnement des sens, et que l’on peut
supprimer sans compromettre l’existence. Ils ne constituent qu’une faculté.
Le droit doit être respecté, protégé et satisfait par la société ou l’État.
La faculté, au contraire, ne lui impose aucune obligation; elle doit être abandonnée à l’activité
individuelle dont elle est le plus énergique ressort” [The vital needs are those that are indis-
pensable to the support of life. In the mind of the individual they constitute rights.
The acquired needs are those which are provided by the reﬁnement of the senses, and which
can be suppressed without threatening existence. They constitute only discretionary powers.
Rights must be respected, protected, and satisﬁed by society or by the State.
Discretionary powers, on the other hand, do not impose any obligation; they must be left to
individual activity of which they are the most energetic incentives] (1848, 24).
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Charlier, therefore, entitlements to property should be assigned on dual
principles each applying to different domains: common property in nat-
ural resources, with guaranteed individual shares in their bounty, but full
private property rights in produced assets. So, the fundamental law that
symbolized truth and justice was as follows:
Que la propriété foncière, œuvre de Dieu, appartient à l’universalitè
des êtres créés: elle est indivisible et immuable comme l’humanité
au service de laquelle elle a été affectée et dont elle doit garantir les
besoins naturels et vitaux;
Que la propriété mobilière, œuvre de l’homme, est essentiellement
personelle: elle est destinée à donner satisfaction aux besoins acquis,
en raison directe du dégré d’activité de chacun.
[Landed property, the work of God, belongs to the community of
created beings: it is indivisible and invariable like humanity itself, to
the service of which it has been intended and of which it must secure
the natural and vital needs.
Mobile wealth, the work of man, is essentially personal: it is des-
tined to give satisfaction to the acquired needs, in direct proportion to
the degree of activity of each person.] (1848, 39)
On a more practical level, the problem to be resolved was the im-
plementation of these principles in a setting in which there was private
landownership, especially in a concentrated form.Although Charlier em-
phasized that private landownership was incompatible with the notion of
a common natural patrimony, he also insisted that current legal titles to
land had to be respected. The proposed resolution hinged on a system
of mutual compensation, mediated by the state, between the minority
of current landowners and the landless majority. Landowners would be
compensated, at least partly and temporarily, for any loss resulting from
the reassertion of the collective right to the land. The landless major-
ity would be compensated permanently through the disbursement of a
“guaranteed minimum.” The state would derive the ﬁnancial resources
for this system of mutual compensation from the socialization of rent
and relatedmeasures. In Charlier’s view, only this mechanism could rem-
edy the injustice of private landownership without introducing another
injustice by a forced dispossession of legal titles. He claimed that his
“humanitarian constitution” provided a “mathematical solution” to the
problem (1848, 21).
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Charlier did not limit himself to a general description of the scheme,
but consistently with his own injunction against impractical plans,
worked it out in great detail and added calculations to show that it was
ﬁnancially sound.40 The main question was whether the state would have
enough ﬁnancial resources for the two compensatory payments. As the
sole landowner, the state would receive all the existing land-rents; in ad-
dition, it would generate new revenue streams by better managing the
land. In exchange for the loss of their land, owners would not receive its
capital value but instead would be entitled to an annual revenue partly
compensating their loss of land-rent income.41 The compensating rev-
enue would vary with the wealth of the landowner: the higher the indi-
vidual fortune of the landowner, the smaller the ratio between revenue
and capital would be.42 Moreover, the revenue would diminish through
time according to the number of intergenerational transfers: with each
transfer the revenue would decrease by a quarter of its original amount.43
The difference between the rent revenues of the state and its compensa-
tion payments to the original landowners would be the amount available
for the guaranteed minimum. Charlier stressed that the right to the mini-
mumwas equal and universal, in that it was possessed by each individual
from birth: this effectively means that his guaranteed minimum is a basic
income in the modern sense.44
The level of the minimum would be established annually; in the
40. The calculations applied to Belgium; he arrived at the conclusion that in the ﬁrst year
the scheme would yield an income of about 50 francs per head. For more details, see Charlier
1848, 47–50.
41. Charlier (1848, 48–49) estimated that in Belgium the total rent-income amounted to
670,020,000 francs; he proposed compensating payments for an amount of 322,000,000 francs,
that is, 48 percent of the total land-rent income.
42. For those owning a fortune worth more than 3 million francs, the compensating revenue
would be equal to 1.5 percent of the estimated land value; for those owning a fortune between
1 and 3 million francs, the percentage would be 2 percent; ﬁnally, for those owning less than 1
million francs, it would be 2.5 percent (1848, 49). Later in the pamphlet he changed the upper
threshold value to 5 million (105).
43. “La valeur de ces biens sera, après l’estimation cadastrale, ou toute autre mode
d’appréciation à déterminer, convertie en rentes viagères au proﬁt des propriétaires et leurs
descendants jusqu’à la quatrième génération et par amortissement d’un quart par génération”
[Based upon survey estimates or any other valuation method to be decided, the value of these
goods will be converted into annuities to the beneﬁt of proprietors and their descendants, and
this until the fourth generation and by depreciation of a quarter per generation] (1848, 40–41).
44. In appendix 1 we reproduce the relevant articles of the humanitarian constitution of
1848 which make this clear; in appendix 2 we give the corresponding articles of the humani-
tarian constitution of 1894.
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beginning it would be fairly low because of the transitional compensa-
tion payments to the original landowners, but it would increase as those
payments declined and eventually ceased. Payments would be made
quarterly, and in cash. The right to the minimum was a personal lifetime
one, inalienable and irrevocable. It was inalienable because “member-
ship” in a society was by nationality; but, ultimately, Charlier hoped that
this criterion would become redundant as the entitlement came to be cal-
culated on a global basis. Alongside the minimum, which expressed the
general obligation of society to guarantee basic necessities for its mem-
bers, there would be other measures reﬂecting particular obligations to
speciﬁc groups. Children would be entitled to education, and the old and
the inﬁrm to special care. The state would provide institutions for these
purposes funded in part from the transfer of the guaranteed minimum to
them (1848, 64, 73, 82, 86).
With intriguing minor variations, this diagnosis and the correspond-
ing prescription remained constant throughout all of Charlier’s subse-
quent works on social theory over nearly ﬁfty years. Two of these vari-
ations were the change in terminology from “guaranteed minimum” to
“territorial dividend” and the increase in the frequency of payment from
quarterly to monthly.45 In his last two works, Charlier assessed the
scheme that had occupied him for most of his life. He listed nineteen
advantages such as a reduction of religious rivalries, robberies, and beg-
ging, a decrease in legal disputes, the abolition of “the domination of
capital over labor,” and so forth (1894b, 244–47). The claimed advan-
tages were so many and various that the scheme resembled a panacea.
Nevertheless, Charlier also looked at the potential disadvantages. Three
of them had worried him since his ﬁrst advocacy of the scheme. These
are particularly fascinating because they directly anticipate some of the
reservations that ﬁgure prominently even in present-day debates.
The ﬁrst potential disadvantage concerned the level of payment that
could be achieved through a scheme apparently based on the market
value of natural resources only. The suspicion was that the aggregate
ﬂow of land-rent revenue would be insufﬁcient to cover the basic needs
of all, especially after the deduction of the compensation payments to the
original landowners (Charlier 1848, 76–77; 1871, 44–45; 1894b, 211–
12, 226–27). Charlier readily accepted that the initial dividend level
would be “necessarily minimal” and probably insufﬁcient to satisfy
45. Compare the appropriate sections in the appendices.
476 History of Political Economy 33:3 (2001)
basic needs. But what about the level once the transitional compensa-
tion payments had fallen signiﬁcantly? Although in some countries the
per capita land-rent revenue might be too low to meet vital needs, Char-
lier believed that on a global scale the dividend generated by the com-
mon patrimony would be more than enough. Incidentally, in most of
his calculations Charlier did not restrict that patrimony to pure natural
resources, that is, to land in its original condition before any changes
resulting from human labor. Without offering any explicit justiﬁcation,
he increased the pool considerably by identifying it with “real estate.”46
This category included not only land in its improved form as a result of
labor, but also buildings and other ﬁxtures. With one possible exception,
no attempt was made to separate the revenue attributable to the original
site from the total.47
The second and related danger was that the provision of a territo-
rial dividend would encourage the population to grow, reducing the per
capita level of payment below a subsistence rate (Charlier 1848, 73–74;
1871, 64–65; 1894b, 241–42). According to Charlier, this would not be
the case; any growth (or decline, for that matter) in population would
follow the “normal course.” Apart from endorsing the familiar appeals
to divine providence, he argued rather unpersuasively that a guaranteed
minimum would have no effect on parents’ calculations (if any) about
family size.
The third concern echoed the Fourierist fear that a guaranteed min-
imum would constitute “une prime d’encouragement à la paresse” [an
46. He moved from “la propriété foncière” to “la propriété immobilière.”
47. “La propriété immobilière produit:
A. Les fruits civils, comprenant les loyers pour l’usage du fonds;
B. Les fruits industriels, c’est-à-dire tout ce que l’homme peut, par son travail, en obtenir
ou extraire.
Les premiers appartiennent, de droit primordial, aux usufruitiers du fonds commun, en vertu
de leur droit sui generis d’usage. Ici, point de propriété personnelle sur le fonds.
Les seconds appartiennent à ceux qui les ont produits; ils constituent dans leur chef le droit
d’en disposer selon leur volonté et leur intérêt. Ces produits donnent donc lieu à un droit de
propriété absolu en leur faveur” [Real estate produces:
A. Civil beneﬁts, including the rents for the use of the fund;
B. Industrial beneﬁts, that is to say everything that man, by his own labor, can obtain or
extract from it.
The ﬁrst belong, by fundamental right, to the usufructuaries of the common fund, by virtue
of their sui generis right of use. In this case, there is no personal property in the fund.
The second belong to those that have produced them; they constitute in their opinion the
right to dispose of them according to their wishes and interests. These products create an abso-
lute property right in their favor] (Charlier 1894a, 17–18).
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incentive to be lazy] (Charlier 1848, 35), which would create a new class
of “rentiers” (Charlier 1871, 51). Charlier recognized the possibility that
some individuals might be content to survive on the dividend alone, but
he accepted without reservation that this was their right:
Tant pis pour les paresseux: ceux-là resteront réduits à la portion con-
grue. Le devoir de la société ne va pas au delà: assurer à chacun sa
juste participation à la jouissance des éléments que la nature a mis à
son service, sans usurpation des uns au préjudice des autres. [Too bad
for the lazy: they will have to get by with the minimum allowance.
The duty of society does not go beyond this: to assure to everyone
his fair share in the enjoyment of the elements that nature has put at
his disposal, without usurpation by some people to the detriment of
others.] (1894b, 56)
Charlier was convinced, however, that this would hold only for a minor-
ity; for the majority, the dividend scheme would actually be an incentive
to labor. The security derived from the guarantee of basic needs would
allow individuals to concentrate on satisfying the expanding domain of
their acquired wants, which could be achieved only through labor itself.
Moreover, that security would promote the independence and dignity of
each human being, liberating all from the tyranny of dependence on oth-
ers, especially for the satisfaction of basic needs (Charlier 1894b, 54–
55).
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that the largely neglected Belgian writer, Joseph
Charlier, presented as early as 1848 a fully developed basic income
scheme, strikingly similar in all signiﬁcant respects to contemporary pro-
posals. In Charlier’s scheme, as in modern proposals, a basic income
would be paid unconditionally to each individual member of society—
as a right—without work requirements or means testing. In one respect
it goes even further than most of today’s basic income plans, since each
individual would be entitled to receive the full amount from birth. More-
over, the guaranteed income would be substantial, at or near the pre-
vailing level of subsistence. In defending his program, Charlier directly
anticipated objections to basic income that still ﬁgure prominently in
present-day controversies. The fundamental objection is that a basic
income licenses the exploitation of those willing to make a productive
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contribution by those unwilling to do so. Charlier directly admitted this
possibility, but denied its relevance in the context of the unconditional
right of each person to enjoy a basic living standard. By means of cal-
culations he tried to establish that a substantial basic income could be
sustained by capturing the rewards of ﬁxed property.
The initial inspiration of Charlier’s views undoubtedly lay in the
Fourierist tradition. We have shown that this tradition did support the
idea of a minimum, but not that of an unconditional one. For Fourier the
minimum could be realized only under a regime of attractive labor, and
even then it would be restricted to the poor and provided in kind rather
than in cash. Considerant endorsed Fourier’s view, but also advocated the
right to work as a more politically realistic possibility. Charlier’s truly
remarkable novelty lay in his sustained advocacy of an unconditional
monetized minimum, which was dependent neither on attractive labor
nor the right to work and could therefore be introduced almost immedi-
ately.
Appendix 1
[from Solution du problème social ou constitution humanitaire, basée
sur la loi naturelle, et précédée de l’exposé de motifs (1848), by Joseph
Charlier]
CONSTITUTION HUMANITAIRE,
ou
LOI ORGANIQUE
Basée sur la loi naturelle
ART. 2. Par cela seul que l’homme existe il a le droit de vivre. Ce
droit, absolu comme le principe dont il dérive, trouve sa garantie dans le
règne végétal créé en vue des besoins physiques de l’humanité. Le sol est
donc essentiellement propriété collective, et à ce titre ne peut appartenir
en propre à des particuliers; les hommes ne sont que les usagers de la
terre.
En conséquence le droit de propriété territoriale réside dans l’État.
Toute possession contraire à ce principe sera rachetée comme atten-
toire au droit collectif de l’humanité.
ART. 3. Les revenus territoriaux seront perçus par l’État au proﬁt de
la collection, comme propriété nationale, et serviront à garantir à chaque
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membre de la société, sans distinction d’âge ni de sexes, un minimum
pour la substantation de ses besoins absolus.
ART. 4. Ce minimum sera ﬁxé annuellement par le grand conseil
représentatif de la nation, sur la valeur locative des immeubles, déduc-
tion faites des charges publiques.
ART. 5. Le droit au minimum est personnel. Il naît et meurt avec
l’individu.
Il est inaliénable et insaisissable.
Néanmoins l’émigration non autorisée en entraînera la suspension
pour toute la durée de l’absence; et la perte déﬁnitive en cas de résidence
à l’étranger sans esprit de retour ou de condamnation pour attentat contre
la sûreté extérieure de l’État.
Il sera payé à chaque individu trimestriellement et en espèces, sur la
présentation de son brevet d’indigénat, en marche duquel chaque paye-
ment sera annoté.
[HUMANITARIAN CONSTITUTION
or
ORGANIC LAW
Based upon the natural law
ART. 2. By the mere fact that he exists, man has the right to live. This
right, which is as absolute as the principle from which it is derived, is
guaranteed by the plant kingdom created in view of the physical needs
of humanity. The land is therefore essentially collective property and for
this reason cannot be owned by individuals.
Men are only the users of the earth.
By consequence, the right of territorial property belongs to the State.
Every possession that is contrary to this principle will be repurchased
because it violates the collective right of humanity.
ART. 3. The territorial revenues will be perceived by the State as na-
tional property to the beneﬁt of the whole and will be used to guarantee
to each member of society, without distinction of age or sex, a minimum
for the satisfaction of his vital needs.
ART. 4. This minimum will be ﬁxed annually by the great council
which represents the nation, based upon the rent value of immobile
wealth, after deduction of the expenses of the state.
480 History of Political Economy 33:3 (2001)
ART. 5. The right to the minimum is personal. It is born and dies with
the individual. It is inalienable and immune from conﬁscation.
Nevertheless, unauthorized emigration will occasion the suspension
of the minimum during the whole period of absence. In the case of res-
idence abroad without the intention of return, or of condemnation for
assault against the external security of the State, the minimum will be
lost for good.
It will be paid to each individual per trimester and in money, on the
presentation of his passport, in the margin of which each payment will
be recorded.]
Appendix 2
[from La question sociale résolue précédée du testament philosophique
d’un penseur (1894), by Joseph Charlier]
CONSTITUTION HUMANITAIRE BASÉE
SUR LA LOI NATURELLE.
ARTICLE PREMIER.—L’homme en naissant apporte avec lui le
droit de vivre. La vie humaine est sacrée.
ART. 2.—La jouissance du droit à la conservation de la vie lui est
garantie par la loi suprême qui régit les mondes, et qui a mis au service
de cette conservation les quatre éléments primordiaux constituant le pat-
rimoine commun de tous:
A. Le soleil qui l’éclaire;
B. L’air qu’il respire;
C. L’eau qui le désaltère;
D. La terre pour le nourrir.
ART. 3.—Il ne peut être établi aucun droit de propriété individuel sur
ce patrimoine, œuvre de Dieu, l’homme n’étant que le simple usager de
la terre. . . .
ART. 18.—Il sera délivré, à la naissance de chaque enfant, un car-
net dans la forme prescrite par la loi pour la perception du dividende
territorial, lequel sera établi, chaque année, sur les bases arrètées par le
gouvernement et approuvées par les Chambres.
Il sera payable par douzième au bureau du préposé dans chaque com-
mune.
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ART. 19.—Le dividende territorial est inaliénable, incessible et insai-
sissable, pour n’importe quelle cause.
ART. 20.—L’indigène qui se ﬁxera à l’étranger pour une période de
plus de cinq années perdra son droit au dividende territorial.
ART. 21.—Les étrangers établis en Belgique et leurs descendants
jusqu’à la troisième génération, nés dans le pays, ne pourront participer
aux dividendes territoriaux, sauf les cas de grande naturalisation ou de
réciprocité de leur pays d’origine, et moyennant que les descendants
aient fait connaître leurs volonté de faire partie de la nation.
[HUMANITARIAN CONSTITUTION BASED
UPON THE NATURAL LAW.
FIRST ARTICLE.—When he is born man brings with him the right
to live. Human life is sacred.
ART. 2.—The exercise of the right to the conservation of life is guar-
anteed by the supreme law that governs the world and that has provided
for this conservation the four fundamental elements that constitute the
common patrimony of all:
A. The sun that gives him light;
B. The air that he breaths;
C. The water that satisﬁes his thirst;
D. The land to feed him.
ART. 3.—There cannot be established any individual property right
on this patrimony, the work of God, since man is but a simple user of the
land. . . .
ART. 18.—At the birth of each child, a booklet will be delivered in
the form prescribed by the law for the receipt of the territorial dividend.
This dividend will be determined each year, on the basis of what has
been decided by the government and approved by the parliament.
It will by paid monthly in the ofﬁce of the government’s agent in each
community.
ART. 19.—The territorial dividend is inalienable, nontransferable,
and immune from conﬁscation, for any reason whatsoever.
ART. 20.—The indigenous person who lives abroad for a period of
more than ﬁve years will lose his right to the territorial dividend.
ART. 21.—The foreigners living in Belgium, and their descendants
born in the country until the third generation, cannot participate in the
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territorial dividends, except in the cases of full naturalization or of reci-
procity with their countries of origin, and on condition that the descen-
dants have shown their willingness to be part of the nation.]
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